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The physical risks of climate change, including both gradual global warming and an 
increase in extreme weather events, are likely to cause increasing financial and economic 
losses. Lower and middle income countries may be more vulnerable to physical risks due to 
their reliance on climate sensitive economic sectors and their limited capacity to absorb 
economic losses. However, vulnerable regions in developed countries are also at risk and 
impacts will also be felt through the global nature of many supply chains.  
Economic risks and impacts due to the physical risks of climate change include demand 
and supply-side losses, reductions in economic growth, destruction of public and private 
capital and output losses. Impacts will be experienced at the macro-economic level as well as 
by individual actors such as companies and investors. Consequently, policy-makers, investors 
and companies will all play a role in responding to the growing financial threat from climate 
change (MacWilliams et al., 2019).  
Despite the potential economic losses and the likelihood that all investments and asset 
classes are exposed to the physical risks of climate change to some degree, few actors in 
the financial sector are incorporating physical risks into decision-making. The Task Force 
on Climate Related Financial Disclosures (TCFD), launched in 2015, has developed a series of 
recommendations for companies to disclose their climate related risks. Investors can then use 
this information to make informed capital allocation decisions. The TCFD argue that increased 
transparency around climate change risks will lead to more efficient markets and more stable and 
resilient economies1. However, it is also possible that a better understanding of physical risks 
could lead to capital flight from risk-exposed investments and a lack of access to finance for 
those who need it most.  
Findings 
There are challenges in assessing physical risks. It is possible to assess the immediate costs 
of changing weather patterns and more frequent and intense natural disasters, but translating 
this into expected future risks is difficult (Grippa et al., 2019; Miller & Swann, 2019). There is also 
an assumption amongst actors that climate risk is owned by governments, which may make it 
difficult to integrate physical risks into financial decision-making.  
This rapid review did not locate any examples of capital flight from developing countries 
due to a better understanding of the physical risks of climate change. Standard & Poor’s 
(2014) argue that climate change risks are likely to have a negative impact on sovereign credit 
ratings. Lower rated sovereigns also appear to be more vulnerable to climate change.  
Evidence from the Bank of Italy suggests that banks are restricting lending to small and medium 
sized Italian firms that are exposed to flood risk (Faiella & Natoli, 2018). In contrast, the market 
response to Pacific Gas & Electric’s (a California, USA investor-owned utility company) 
bankruptcy suggests that it has not caused imminent concern about climate change risks in the 
utility sector (MacWilliams et al., 2019).  
 
1 https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/about/# [accessed 17/01/2020].  
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The physical risks of climate change will differentially affect businesses and the financial 
performance of sectors, and as well as creating risks, could also create opportunities for 
investors (UNEP FI, 2018). A small body of commentators argue that physical risks create 
opportunities for investment, including in resilient infrastructure. A better understanding of 
physical risks could also lead to more efficient investment and allocation of capital.  
Potential mechanisms for building resilience to natural disasters and facilitating recovery 
following a disaster could help vulnerable countries and regions adapt to the physical risks of 
climate change. Mechanisms discussed in the literature include: 
• Investing in resilient infrastructure: Marto et al. (2017) find that investments in 
adaptation infrastructure lead to reductions in the magnitude of economic damage 
following a natural disaster, as well as reduced risk of debt distress.  
• Sovereign risk insurance: Bevan and Adam (2016) find that insurance may or may not 
be helpful depending on detailed circumstances, with the value of insurance being 
highest when the worst case disaster materialises. The benefits of insurance must also 
be weighed against the carrying costs and the conditions of the contract.  
• Bond financing: Mittnik et al. (2019) find that bond financing can accelerate recovery 
and it can lead to output, consumption and private and public capital rising again 
following a disaster. It can also help to reduce the frequency and severity of natural 
disasters through financing adaptation. However, there may be limitations to bond issuing 
and credit expansion in low income countries, particularly small countries.  
Evidence base 
The evidence base for this request was extremely limited. Only one report produced for the 
United Nations Environment Programme’s Finance Initiative directly addressed the risk of capital 
flight. This review found small but growing bodies of literature on the macro-economic risks of 
climate change; the economic consequences of extreme weather events; policy options for 
improving resilience to and recovery following an extreme weather event; and, climate change as 
an opportunity for investors. This report undertook a series of keyword searches and review of 
relevant websites including the IMF, the World Bank, the Bank of England, and credit rating 
agencies amongst others.  
2. Physical climate change risks 
Physical risks of climate change can be defined as: “those risks that arise from the interaction of 
climate-related hazards (including hazardous events and trends) with the vulnerability of 
exposure of human and natural systems, including their ability to adapt” (Batten et al., 2016, 
quoted in Miller & Swann, 2019: 5). A risk has three components: a hazard (an event with the 
potential to cause harm); probability (can be assigned to the frequency of a given hazard or a 
given socio-economic consequence); and, vulnerability (the outcomes of climate hazards in 
terms of their cost) (Batten, 2018).  
Physical risks arise from two main sources: gradual global warming, and an increase in extreme 
weather events (Miller & Swann, 2019: 5). The TCFD categorises the physical risks of climate 
change into (IIGCC, 2019: 28): 
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• Acute risks: Event driven risks, including increased severity of extreme weather events, 
such as cyclones, hurricanes or floods.  
• Chronic risks: Longer term shifts in climate patterns, such as changes in precipitation 
patterns, rising mean temperatures, or rising sea levels.  
Climate change will increase the frequency and intensity of natural disasters including cyclones 
and hurricanes (Marto et al., 2019). 
Low income countries 
Lower and middle income economies are typically more vulnerable to physical risks 
(Grippa et al., 2019). This is due to their reliance on agricultural production and employment, and 
their vulnerability to climate related natural disasters combined with their weaker capacity to 
absorb the financial cost (Standard & Poor’s, 2014; Mittnik et al., 2019; Marto et al., 2017). ). 
Marto et al. (2019) argue that small developing states are often more frequently hit by extreme 
weather events than larger countries and their economic costs are often much larger (Marto et 
al., 2017).  
Low income countries have limited economic and financial capacity to adapt to climate 
change or respond to extreme weather events (Mittnik et al., 2019; Marto et al., 2017). 
Extreme weather events involve both direct losses of public capital and indirect losses due to 
reduced output (Bevan & Adam, 2016). Some estimates suggest that indirect losses might be 
even greater than direct losses for low income countries (Mittnik et al., 2019). The speed at 
which public capital stock is restored post-disaster plays a decisive role in determining the 
recovery in private output and consumption (Bevan & Adam, 2016: 1). Small disaster-prone 
countries may find it difficult to access external debt markets following a natural disaster (Bevan 
& Adam, 2016).   
Vulnerabilities can interact to pose severe challenges for developing countries (Marto et 
al., 2017). For example, natural disaster risk in Vanuatu interacts with the cumulative impact of 
non-extreme but prolonged weather events such as El Nino droughts and La Nina’s heavy 
rainfall, and other chronic risks of climate change including sea level rise and coastal erosion 
(Marto et al., 2017). The probability of a natural disaster happening in Vanuatu in any given year 
is 65% and more than 99% in a five year period (Marto et al., 2017). In 2015, Cyclone Pam hit 
Vanuatu causing losses of approximately 60% of GDP and affecting more than 188,000 
inhabitants (more than 70% of the population) (Marto et al., 2017). Losses in key productive 
sectors included damage to tourism and transport infrastructure estimated at 11% of GDP and 
production losses in agriculture and tourism equivalent to 14% of GDP (Marto et al., 2017).  
Economic impacts of physical risks 
Both acute and chronic risks are already causing financial and economic losses in both 
developing and developed economies (Miller & Swann, 2019: 10). For example, economic 
losses due to weather and climate related extremes in EU member states was almost half a 
trillion Euros between 1980 and 2017 (Levick, 2019). Losses from extreme weather events have 
steadily increased since the early 1980s, most significantly in Asia and North America (Standard 
& Poor’s, 2014). Insurance is likely to become more expensive, or even unavailable in at-risk 
areas of the world, as losses from natural disasters increase (Grippa et al., 2019: 27). 
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Acute risks are likely to cause immediate economic damage through unanticipated 
shocks to components of demand and supply, which could last into the medium term 
(Batten, 2018). Extreme weather events cause physical damage to infrastructure, agriculture and 
property (Grippa et al., 2019). This damage has a number of effects including: increasing 
insurance premiums; disrupting businesses; reducing business investment; affecting global 
supply chains; increasing costs to stakeholders; reducing the longevity and efficiency of physical 
capital; exposing certain sectors to losses in value (e.g. coastal real estate); and reductions in 
bilateral trade (IIGCC, 2019: 29; Grippa et al., 2019; MacWilliams et al., 2019; Batten, 2018). For 
example, public infrastructure networks such as transport, energy and water supply are 
characterised by complex supply chains that rely heavily on international infrastructure, and are 
therefore inherently vulnerable to disruptions caused by weather events across the globe 
(Batten, 2018). 
Economic damage from chronic risks are likely to manifest over the longer term through 
impacts on potential productive capacity and economic growth (Batten, 2018). For 
example, higher temperatures can cause economic losses through reductions in productivity of 
workers and agricultural crops (Batten, 2018). Companies’ financial performance may also be 
affected by changes in water availability, sourcing and quality, food security and extreme 
temperature changes, which affect an organisation’s property, operations, supply chains, 
transport needs, and employee safety (Miller & Swann, 2019: 5). There is an emerging 
consensus within the climate change economics literature that changing temperatures will have a 
direct impact of the level of GDP growth (Batten, 2018).  
The physical risks of climate change could have a number of direct and indirect losses on 
the financial sector. Haley (2019) states that there are USD 1 trillion of company assets at risk 
over the next five years due to climate change, with the financial services industry accounting for 
80% of that exposure. Direct losses come from financial institutions exposure to companies, 
households and countries that experience climate shocks. Indirect losses come from the effects 
of climate change on the wider economy.  
Potential impacts on the financial sector include (Grippa et al., 2019; Batten, 2018):  
• Market losses (equities, bonds and commodities), credit losses (residential and corporate 
loans), and underwriting losses. 
• Greater risk in mortgage portfolios due to rising sea levels.  
• Tighter financial conditions if banks reduce lending, in particular when climate shocks 
affect many institutions simultaneously. 
• Banks, insurers and reinsurers may become less diversified as climate change can 
increase the likelihood or impact of events previously considered uncorrelated, for 
example droughts and floods.  
• Financial stability concerns if asset prices adjust rapidly to reflect unexpected realisations 
of physical risks.  
• Inflationary pressures if an extreme weather event leads to a decline in the supply of 
goods or a productivity shock.  
6 
3. Incorporating physical risk into financial decision-
making 
Few in the financial sector are incorporating physical climate risks into investment 
decision-making (Miller & Swann, 2019). Whilst knowledge of how physical risks impact risks 
and opportunities is rapidly evolving, clear risk management practices are still nascent (Miller & 
Swann, 2019: 8). Physical climate risk is inherent to all investments and financial asset classes 
(Miller & Swann, 2019). Understanding and internalising that risk into financial decision-making 
could both reduce exposure to risk and identify opportunities to invest in resilience (Miller & 
Swann, 2019).  
Challenges in assessing physical risk and economic impacts 
Assessing physical climate risks and their implications for financial actors and the 
financial system can be complicated (Miller & Swann, 2019). Physical climate risks involve 
specific hazards in a specific physical location; the various financial implications of a hazard 
partly depend on the circumstances of the company or client including its own financial health 
and ability to withstand financial impacts from business interruption; and, anticipating the 
timeframe over which physical climate risks will become material (Miller & Swann, 2019). 
Understanding how these risks impact investment requires understanding risks across a number 
of different time horizons including the timeframe of asset life and the timeframe of financial 
exposure (Miller & Swann, 2019).  
Climate change externality is different to other types of externalities, which makes it 
difficult to assess its macro-economic impacts (Batten, 2018). Challenges for assessing its 
macro-economic impacts include: climate change is global in causes and consequences; its 
impacts are long-term and persistent; there are pervasive uncertainties about its economic 
impacts; and, there is a serious risk of major, irreversible change (Batten, 2018).  
Climate economics is beset with uncertainty (Batten, 2018). This includes uncertainty around 
the ability to accurately model the impact of climate change on society and the economy; the 
future ability of societies to adapt to climate change and the effect of technological change on 
future greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions; and, around the discount rate used in modelling work 
to aggregate costs and benefits occurring at different points in time (Batten, 2018). As GHGs 
persist in the atmosphere for a century or more, the costs of climate change and the benefits of 
mitigation must be measured over a longer timescale than for other socio-economic issues 
(Batten, 2018).  
Quantifying the link between the likelihood of extreme outcomes and catastrophic 
damages can depend on the definition of vulnerability (Mittnik et al., 2019: 34). The link 
between GHG emissions and temperature rise may increase vulnerability to disaster (Mittnik et 
al., 2019). But, vulnerability is also defined by how much adaptation has taken place and how 
effective it has been (Mittnik et al., 2019:34).  Consequently, increased frequency of climate 
disasters could be accompanied by a lower severity due to successful adaptation policy (Mittnik 
et al., 2019).  
Ownership of climate risk 
The absence of clear ownership of climate risk in many sectors also leads to expectations 
of publicly funded assistance following extreme weather events/natural disasters (Miller & 
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Swann, 2019: 8). This further discourages investment in resilience (Miller & Swann, 2019: 8). For 
example, many developing countries operate on the assumption that climate change related 
disasters will be addressed through international aid after the disaster (Miller & Swann, 2019).  
Miller & Swann (2019) argue that there is a perception that governments and the public 
balance sheet are the backstop for climate risks. This reinforces a perception that climate risk 
is ‘owned’ or borne by public balance sheets especially as governments are typically the only 
source of funding for disaster risk relief and management (Miller & Swann, 2019). There is a lack 
of incentives in the financial system for good climate risk management, either through fully 
pricing climate risks in or through policy directives requiring information disclosure (Miller & 
Swann, 2019). This is likely to increase pressure on public budgets to absorb the costs of climate 
risks, even though they may not be able to (Miller & Swann, 2019).  
4. Physical risk and capital flight  
Improving the availability of risk data and understanding of exposure to the physical risks 
of climate change, and identifying the financial implications of climate risks, could have 
two potential outcomes (Levick, 2019; Miller & Swann, 2019: 8): 
• It could lead to more efficient and stable financial markets and more effective 
investment, as well enormous opportunities for profitable investment by all types of 
investors including public and private finance.   
• It could lead to capital flight from risk-exposed investments and a lack of access to 
finance for those who need it most.  
Capital flight 
Understanding the financial risks from climate change has the potential to influence 
capital flows, including capital shifts and capital flight from areas where investment is 
most needed (Miller & Swann, 2019: 22). A better understanding of the links between physical 
climate change and financial risks could lead to climate change risk being efficiently priced in to 
finance (Miller & Swann, 2019). A 2019 report prepared by the Climate Finance Advisors for the 
United Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative (UNEP FI) and the Global 
Commission of Adaptation argues that this could lead to financial flight from some types of 
investment, particularly of private capital (Miller & Swann, 2019: 22).  
Markets could come to perceive investments in communities and countries that are highly 
vulnerable to climate change as too risky (Miller & Swann, 2019). A 2015 report undertaken 
by the University of Cambridge argues that changes in the behaviour of regulators and financial 
markets will accelerate as the physical impacts of climate change intensify (CISL, 2015). Markets 
could seek to shed at risk assets (CISL, 2015). Scenario analysis in CISL (2015) suggests that 
climate change entails ‘unhedgeable risks” for investment portfolios as changing asset 
allocations combined with investing in sectors exhibiting low climate risk can offset only half of 
the negative impacts of climate change on financial portfolios.  
Shifts in market perceptions could have implications for development banks, development 
finance institutions and domestic financing institutions (Miller & Swann, 2019). These 
organisations have a mandate to accelerate development, including through catalysing private 
investment (Miller & Swann, 2019). A better understanding of the physical risks of climate 
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change could lead to these institutions needing to leverage their balance sheets more to 
incentivise private investment (Miller & Swann, 2019). This could place pressure on their credit 
ratings and eventually on public budgets that are already stretched thin in some countries (Miller 
& Swann, 2019: 23).  
Capital flight from developing countries could have major economic consequences (Miller 
& Swann, 2019). These include placing additional pressure on public balance sheets, which 
alone cannot bear the costs of climate risk (Miller & Swann, 2019).  
The risk of capital flight is likely to vary due to locations’ vulnerabilities to the physical 
risks of climate change and the type of investment and investors (Miller & Swann, 2019). 
For example, for some listed equities the presence of climate risk may have little impact on their 
capacity to invest or attract capital in the short-term (Miller & Swann, 2019). Some private capital 
may not flee but rather require greater returns, which could be attractive to some investors, or it 
could internalise climate risk into pricing for the short-term and focus on short-term returns (Miller 
& Swann, 2019). The availability of finance could also vary by sector and market (Miller & 
Swann, 2019).    
Risks to sovereign creditworthiness 
Climate change is likely to negatively impact sovereign creditworthiness in most cases 
(Standard & Poor’s, 2014)2. Impacts on creditworthiness will be felt through channels including 
economic growth, external performance and public finances (Standard & Poor’s, 2014). Standard 
& Poor’s (2014) argue that climate change is a global mega-trend that will put downward 
pressure on sovereign ratings: 
• Economic growth: climate change is likely to negatively impact national welfare and 
economic growth potential. Observations corroborating this expectation could lead 
Standard & Poor’s to lower sovereign ratings on the most affected sovereigns.  
• Public finances: negative impacts on growth as well as the costs of disaster recovery, 
emergency support and reconstruction following an extreme weather event are likely to 
put pressure on national budgets. This could potentially put downward pressure on 
sovereign ratings as debts and deficits rise.  
• External performance: climate change may put pressure on a sovereign’s external 
accounts in a number of ways including undermining the export base (for countries who 
depend on exports of agricultural products for foreign currency) and threatening foreign 
reserves as trade imbalances rise; bad harvests leading to food imports; and, if global 
food production stagnates, prices for agricultural goods would permanently increase. 
Increasing pressure on external accounts could in turn increase the downside risks for 
sovereign ratings.  
 
2 It is important to note that a number of factors are accessed to determine a sovereign’s credit rating including 
institutional and governance effectiveness, and different credit rating agencies will use different methodologies. 
Standard & Poor’s are highlighted here as the cited report was the only example of the links between climate 
change and sovereign credit rating that could be found during the course of this review. Standard & Poor’s (2014) 
argue that the significance of climate change in accessing climate risk will increase over the coming decades as 
evidence of it economic implications become more visible.  
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Lower rated sovereigns appear more exposed to climate change (Standard & Poor’s, 2014). 
Standard & Poor’s (2014) use a composite of three variables to measure the vulnerability of 
individual sovereigns. These three variables are: share of the population living in coastal areas 
below five metres of altitude; share of agriculture in national GDP; and, the Notre Dame 
University Global Adaptation Index (ND-GAIN) which measures the degree to which a system is 
susceptible to and unable to cope with the adverse effects of climate change (Standard & Poor’s, 
2014).  
Information for all three variables was available for 116 sovereigns. An overall rank of 
vulnerability was assigned based on ranking the sum of the three ranks for each of the three 
indicators (Standard & Poor’s, 2014). Overall rankings run from 116 (the most vulnerable to 
climate change) to 1 (the least vulnerable to climate change). Findings include (Standard & 
Poor’s, 2014: 9-10): 
• Lower rated sovereigns tend on average to be more vulnerable than higher rated 
sovereigns.  
• The average vulnerability rank of AAA rated sovereigns is 18, whilst for B rated 
sovereigns it is 84. 
• This indicates that over a long time horizon, climate change could contribute to diverging 
ratings. Sovereign ratings could diverge further if the lowest-rated sovereigns do in fact 
experience the greatest impact from changing weather patterns and rising sea levels. 
• The most vulnerable sovereigns also tend to be poorer, which makes it challenging for 
them to invest in mitigation measures that would help them adapt to climate change. All 
of the sovereigns in the top 20 most vulnerable are emerging markets and almost all of 
them in Africa and Asia. In contrast the bottom 20 least vulnerable group is dominated by 
advanced economies.  
Opportunities 
A better understanding of the physical risks of climate change could also lead to new 
business models and opportunities for profitable investment (Miller & Swann, 2019). This 
includes insurance and other financial mechanisms which could help countries vulnerable to 
climate change attract investment capital (Miller & Swann, 2019). The TCFD’s 2017 report 
includes the development of insurance risk solutions as a climate change related opportunity. 
Related to this there would be market opportunities in terms of access to new assets and 
locations needing insurance coverage (TCFD, 2017). A better understanding of the physical risks 
could also potentially increase the demand for financial products and services to help manage or 
adapt to the risks (UNEP FI, 2018). For example, in the retail mortgage sector there could be an 
increase in the demand for loans for home improvements for cooling homes in areas where this 
previously has not been needed (UNEP FI, 2018). In the agricultural sector, farmers may change 
their business models and move into alternative crops (UNEP FI, 2018).    
Climate resilient infrastructure is a key opportunity (Haley, 2019). Whilst investment in 
resilient infrastructure may be more expensive, it will deliver more sustainable infrastructure in 
the long-run (Haley, 2019). Estimates suggests that an average of 3% additional upfront capital 
investment is required to build resilience into infrastructure (Haley, 2019). However, every USD 1 
invested in resilience generates USD 4 in economic value (Haley, 2019). A better understanding 
of climate change could also prevent capital flight as risks will be accurately priced into 
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infrastructure projects, as well as helping vulnerable geographies attract the right kind of 
investments (Haley, 2019).  
 
Haley (2019) argues that the lack of climate risk standards has resulted in an inefficient allocation 
of capital with regards to protecting assets from physical climate risks. A better understanding of 
climate change will enable effective quantification and pricing of physical risks as well as mitigate 
future human and financial disasters (Haley, 2019).  
 
Integrating climate resilience into project development makes investments both robust 
and long term, which is a clear advantage for private investors (Miller & Swann, 2019: 6). 
Examples include offshore wind farms in tropical regions that are able to survive hurricanes or 
typhoons, or investments in low-cost products to cool buildings (Miller & Swann, 2019: 6).  
Awareness of the physical risks of climate change and potential related opportunities appear to 
be growing amongst investors. In addition to the TCFD, the Institutional Investors Group on 
Climate Change (IIGCC) formed in 2006 and the Coalition for Climate Resilient Investment 
formed in 2019.  The IIGCC is a membership body of over 200 European institutional investors 
overseeing more than EUR 30 trillion in assets globally3. The Coalition for Climate Resilient 
Investment represents 34 companies and organisations with more than USD 5 trillion in assets 
(Haley, 2019).  
5. Measures to address physical risks 
Resilient infrastructure  
Encouraged by international organisations including the IMF, the World Bank and the 
African Development Bank, disaster-prone developing countries are focusing on 
preparation and adaptation (Simison, 2019). The IMF argues that investing in resilience could 
cut the costs of post-disaster intervention by at least half (Simison, 2019). However, many 
vulnerable countries may be unable to finance investments in resilience themselves (Simison, 
2019).  
The increasing frequency and intensity of extreme weather events due to climate change 
highlights the importance of resilient infrastructure (Marto et al., 2017). Resilient 
infrastructure includes adaptation infrastructure capital such as seawalls as well climate-proofing 
roads to withstand stronger natural disasters (Marto et al., 2017). Boosting infrastructure 
investment is important for economic development (Marto et al., 2017): 
it is critical to be mindful of the trade-offs involved in deciding how much and what type of 
infrastructure to install and to take mitigating measures where and when necessary. 
Otherwise, economic and social costs after storms and other climate-related shocks will 
be unbearable.  
Marto et al.’s (2017) small open economy model analyses how small developing states could 
build resilience to and recover from natural disasters. The model is calibrated to a small, low-
income economy and is applied to Vanuatu (Marto et al., 2017). It analyses the feasibility of ex 
ante policies (building adaptation infrastructure and fiscal buffers), contrasting these with post-
 
3 https://www.iigcc.org/ [accessed 17/10/2020].  
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disaster support provided by donors (Marto et al., 2017). The model also allows comparison of 
alternative paths of post-disaster reconstruction including alternative financing modes and their 
implications for growth and debt sustainability (Marto et al., 2017).  
Marto et al.’s (2017) model estimates what could have happened if the government of Vanuatu 
had spent 3% of GDP per year on adaptation infrastructure in the 5 years prior to 2015’s Cyclone 
Pam. Results include: 
• The magnitude of cyclone damage would have been reduced.  
• Investments in adaptation would have reduced damage to standard public infrastructure 
by 5.2% and damage to private capital by 9.7%. Productivity losses in the tradeable and 
non-tradeable sectors would have been reduced by 3.8% and 3.9% respectively.  
• Reduced risk of debt distress: public debt would have reached less than 60% of GDP 
over the medium term as opposed to 105% of GDP in a scenario where the government 
does not invest in resilient infrastructure and finances reconstruction from external 
borrowing. 
• Helping the government build resilience also lowers costs for donors as it is cheaper than 
dealing with the consequences of unmitigated shocks.     
• Fiscal buffers, i.e. contingency funds saved by small developing states, may have some 
value for states that experience relatively frequent events of manageable proportions as 
these are unlikely to elicit a major response from donors. However, this argument does 
not apply to truly catastrophic events such as Cyclone Pam. A small developing state 
could not save enough to deal with a future cataclysmic event without stunting its 
development. Any money it did save would help to reduce the burden on its donors, but it 
would not be rational for a developing country to try and save money to its donors.  
The role of donor aid 
Marto et al. (2017) also model the support needed from the donor community to fund 
reconstruction following Cyclone Pam. Findings include that the donor community would need to 
commit significant resources: an additional 50% of pre-cyclone GDP in grants over a period of 15 
years after the cyclone (Marto et al., 2017). Despite initial commitments from the international 
community, which were lower than the levels Marto et al., (2017) estimate were needed, 
disbursement has not followed suit (Marto et al., 2017). This suggests that the pace of 
reconstruction will be slower than expected and important infrastructure projects may take more 
time to materialise (Marto et al., 2017: 20).  
Sovereign risk insurance 
In the event of a disaster, sovereign risk insurance covers the direct costs of the rebuild, with 
some market-based insurance being bundled up with technical expertise, which means the 
rebuild rate may be faster (Bevan & Adam, 2016). However, the benefits of insurance must be 
weighed against the cost of carrying insurance, which is financed by the domestic tax system 
(Bevan & Adam, 2016).  
High damage hurricanes, for example, are rare events (Bevan & Adam, 2016). Therefore, Bevan 
and Adam (2016) argue that whether or not it is worthwhile to have insurance depends on the 
nature of the insurance contract, the economic consequences of the loss of public capital and the 
expected frequency of high-damage events. Insurers typically charge a high premium so the 
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insurance is not actuarially fair (Bevan & Adam, 2016). Marto et al. (2017: 24) argue that small 
developing states may see purchasing catastrophe insurance as a wasteful transfer to more 
developed economies as it could decrease the amount of their post-disaster aid by the size of the 
insurance pay out.  
Modelling sovereign risk insurance 
Bevan and Adam (2016) use a dynamic general equilibrium model to examine sovereign disaster 
risk insurance, increased taxation and budget reallocation as alternative financing mechanisms 
for reconstruction following a disaster. The model is calibrated using national accounts data and 
a natural disaster profile for Jamaica, and focuses on the specific risks posed by tropical 
cyclones (Bevan & Adam, 2016). The model includes simulations for no cyclone, a one-in-10 
year intensity cyclone, a one-in-25 year cyclone, a one-in-100 cyclone, and a one-in-500 cyclone 
(Bevan & Adam, 2016). It is assumed that the economy is exposed to the chosen risk distribution 
in year 1 but not in subsequent years, i.e. there is no repeated exposure to cyclones after the 
initial shock (Bevan & Adam, 2016).   
Assumptions within the model include that the destruction is entirely concentrated on the public 
infrastructure capital stock, no direct destruction of private capital or loss of lives or current output 
occurs as a result of the hazard (Bevan & Adam, 2016). Impact on private capital and 
consumption occurs solely through the loss of the complementary public infrastructure capital 
(Bevan & Adam, 2016).  
Insurance may or may not be helpful depending on detailed circumstances: the value of 
insurance is highest when the worst case materialises (Bevan & Adam, 2016). Other key 
findings include (Bevan & Adam, 2016: 21): 
• In the absence of donor grants, tax financing is the best method for financing 
reconstruction and is always preferable to insurance in an either-or choice. But, this 
presupposes that increased taxation on the required scale is feasible, which is not always 
the case.  
• Budget reallocation is potentially very damaging, with any diversion of recurrent spending 
for O&M likely to be very costly and worse than a do-nothing approach.  
• The opportunity cost of funds is highly variable; if a tax financing regime were feasible, 
this might be only around 6%-9%, but if re-allocations from O&M were used, this might 
be as high as 37%-44%. The opportunity costs of insurance, on the other hand, might fall 
in the range 12%-15%, higher than the tax alternative, but much lower than the 
reallocation from O&M.  
Bond financing 
Bond financing can accelerate recovery and it can lead to output, consumption and 
private and public capital rising again following a disaster (Mittnik et al., 2019). Mittnik et al. 
(2019) use a multi-phase dynamic macro model to analyse the macroeconomic effects of rare 
large disasters arising from climate change and explore the impact of bond financing for building 
resilience to and recovery from a natural disaster. The model has three phases: phase one, 
mitigation and adaptation to climate change is financed through taxation. In phase two, the 
disaster phase, small and large disasters reduce capital stock and increase risk premia for credit 
financing. During this phase bond financing is added. In phase three, bond issuing ceases and 
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bonds are paid back through a tax rate on income, but the economy may face some persistent 
effects on risk premia (Mittnik et al., 2019).   
Comparing weak and strong shocks, Mittnik et al. (2019) find that: 
• For both weak and strong shocks debt rises, and public and private capital is damaged, 
with the size of capital stocks shrinking, although there are differences in severity.  
• Amplified disaster risk and actual disasters affect private and public capital stocks 
directly; risk premia are detrimentally affected. 
• Weak shock: the economy can continuously grow with high borrowing, financing climate 
related infrastructure investments and appropriate mitigation and adaptation policies. 
Bond financing, used to fund effective mitigation and adaptation policies, generates 
higher debt, but lower debt-to capital ratios and higher welfare than in it does in relation 
to strong shocks.  
• Strong shock: there is a stronger and longer disaster related period with lower growth. 
Stronger disasters generate smaller expansions of capital stocks and much lower 
consumption levels. Debt rises steadily due to risk premia increasing.  
Mittnik et al. (2019) argue that bond financing can provide funds for, and improve, both 
adaptation and be effective in rebuilding public infrastructure after a natural disaster. By financing 
adaptation, bond financing can help to reduce the frequency and severity of natural disasters, 
help reverse slow long-run climate change impacts and help build early warning systems which 
can help reduce vulnerability to climate disasters (Mittnik et al., 2019). Green bonds are 
increasing: municipalities in both the developed and developing world have issued green bonds 
are a means of raising funds; the World Bank issues bonds for developing countries; and, some 
investment banks have also developed green bonds (Mittnik et al., 2019).  
However, there are limitations to bond issuing and credit expansion in low income countries 
(Mittnik et al., 2019). For example, small low income countries have restricted opportunity for 
achieving scale effects from credit expansions and bond issuing (Mitnik et al., 2019).  
6. Case studies 
Italy 
Bank lending to Italian small and medium-sized enterprises is negatively correlated with 
their flood risk exposure (Faiella & Natoli, 2018). Faiella & Natoli (2018) investigate the 
relationship between bank lending and catastrophic risk by matching data on flood risk with 
proprietary data on bank loans at the municipal level. After controlling for sectoral and province 
level effects, Faiella & Natoli (2018) find that catastrophic risk has a negative effect on bank 
lending.  
A robustness check uses province-level data from a different proprietary dataset, which allows 
the authors to distinguish between credit granted by small and big banks to small and small firms 
(Faiella & Natoli, 2018). This robustness check confirms the results for small and medium sized 
firms (Faiella & Natoli, 2018). Faiella & Natoli (2018) argue that whilst there is no identification of 
demand and supply drivers of credit, their results suggest that banks can discriminate borrowers 
based on their catastrophic risk exposure, but only ration credit to small firms, who are less able 
to diversify risk.  
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USA 
Pacific Gas & Electric 
This investor-owned utility company in California, USA filed for bankruptcy in 2019. 
Commentators have labelled this the ‘first climate change bankruptcy’ (MacWilliams, 2019). 
Rapid climatic changes caused prolonged droughts in California, USA (Grippa et al., 2019). This 
dramatically increased the risk of fires from investor-owned utility company, Pacific Gas and 
Electric’s operations (Grippa et al., 2019). In January 2019 the company estimated it faced 
liabilities of over USD 30 billion from wildfires in 2017 and 2018 (MacWilliams et al., 2019).  
Policy responses can determine how the costs of climate change are allocated 
(MacWilliams et al., 2019). California state legislation, that came into force in July 2019, 
combines measures to both mitigate the risks of future fires, and allocate the costs of any future 
damages (MacWilliams et al., 2019). Mitigation measures include (MacWilliams et al., 2019): 
• USD 5 billion of safety investments that utilities are required to make, on which they 
cannot earn a return on equity.  
• The establishment of a Wildfire Safety Advisory Board to review utilities’ implementation 
of specific safety requirements (including having an approved fire mitigation plan and a 
fire safety committee).  
• The Advisory Board advises the California Public Utility Commission on whether to issue 
utilities with a safety certificate.  
The legislation also established a USD 21 billion wildfire insurance fund, capitalised equally 
through ratepayers and investor-owned utilities’ contributions (MacWilliams et al., 2019). A safety 
certificate is a prerequisite for accessing funding through these mechanisms (MacWilliams et al., 
2019). The fund was meant to restore investor confidence4. In April 2019, Standard & Poor’s 
threatened to downgrade all of California’s utilities to junk status if a new regulatory framework 
was not adopted (MacWilliams et al., 2019: 26-27). 
The creation of the wildfire insurance fund provides important policy lessons for 
designing comprehensive frameworks for allocating climate damage costs, but there are 
also potential pitfalls (MacWilliams et al., 2019: 7). The fund and the broader legislation defines 
utilities’ financial exposure for climate damage situations and provides liquidity for utilities to 
provide essential services when facing large disasters (MacWilliams et al., 2019: 7). The former 
is beneficial for investors (MacWilliams et al., 2019).  
However, the large reserves set aside by the fund will result in higher electricity bills; being 
unable to earn on a return on safety-related spending may diminish the incentives for proactive 
climate mitigation investment; and, the fund may be insufficient for future wildfire costs and 
creates uncertainty about how these costs will be allocated (MacWilliams et al., 2019: 7).  
The legislation did not reform the California legal framework that allows utilities to be held liable 
for damages they did not cause (MacWilliams et al., 2019: 8). This perpetuates risks for 
companies and ratepayers (MacWilliams et al., 2019). It could create liquidity and other financial 
 
4 https://www.theguardian.com/business/2019/oct/31/pge-utility-california-wildfires [accessed 
13/01/2020].  
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difficulties for investor-owned utilities even if they are allowed to recover the costs through the 
wildfire fund (MacWilliams et al., 2019). Cost recovery could take years and create considerable 
uncertainty that could be reflected in utilities share prices and borrowing costs (MacWilliams et 
al., 2019).   
Market responses to Pacific Gas & Electric’s bankruptcy suggest that it has not caused 
imminent concern about climate risks in the utility sector outside of California 
(MacWilliams et al., 2019). Reasons for this could include (MacWilliams et al., 2019): 
• investors believe that cost increases from climate change will occur too far in the future to 
materially impact the present value of their investments;  
• they may view wildfires as a California-specific risk;  
• they may reflect the belief that the costs of climate change in the utility sector will fall on 
ratepayers, insurance companies and/or taxpayers as opposed to investors; 
• they may lack the information or modelling tools to assess the likelihood and geographic 
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